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Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic
Powers vis-à-vis Neoliberalism? The Case of the
Colombian Constitutional Court
Maria Paula Saffon1
I. INTRODUCTION
A.

The Paradoxical Expansion of Neoliberal Policies and Social Rights
Protection

In recent decades, neoliberal economic policies2 have expanded
throughout the world while at the same time social rights3 have begun to be
vigorously protected by national judicial systems. The parallel existence of
these two competing phenomena constitutes a great paradox. Indeed, the
breaking point between neoliberal ideas and policies and other egalitarian
liberal democratic positions is, without a doubt, the discussion on social
rights protection. Seen as unjust, authoritarian, and inefficient, social rights
protection is strongly criticized by neoliberal theorists coming from
philosophical, classical economic, and institutional perspectives. These
differing perspectives share one common view: social rights protection is a
great obstacle to the guarantee of civil rights, the free market, and economic
development.4
In a time when neoliberalism seems to have triumphed, it is strange that
one of the tendencies that fiercely confronts it has acquired such impetus.
Since the late 1970s, and with an unforeseen importance in the 1980s and
1990s, social rights have been vigorously protected in many countries of the
world.5

This protection has been possible through the application of

international treaties6 that deal with the issue, as well as through the
progressive activism7 of a large number of national courts.8

However,

neoliberal policies have, at the same time, moved forward under the
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auspices of international organizations9 and been welcomed by national
governments.10
The vigorous judicial protection of social rights appears as a reaction to
policies, such as those proposed by neoliberalism, which endanger the
social achievements obtained in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.11 During
those times—during the height of the welfare state and state redistributive
policies—political and administrative powers, not judges, properly assumed
the protection of social rights.12 In contrast, political and administrative
powers currently advocate for the dismantlement of redistributive policies,
while judges fiercely argue that social rights should be upheld before the
law.13
B.

The Protection of Social Rights: A Tool for Emancipation or a
Legitimization Tactic?
What seems particularly paradoxical about the tension between the

progress of neoliberal strategies and judicial activism regarding social rights
is the involvement of state actors on both sides: on the one hand, the
legislative and executive branches and on the other, the judicial branch. In
analyzing the relationship between law and social emancipation,14 such
tension may be interpreted in two ways: first, as a true resistance by the
judiciary vis-à-vis the strategies put forward by other public powers or
second, as a legitimization tactic of neoliberal policies.

The first

interpretation posits that the tension surrounding social rights protection is a
matter of clashing globalization movements. These analyses describe the
existence of two different, opposing globalizing movements: the first is
hegemonic globalization that propagates neoliberal ideas and policies,15 and
the second is counterhegemonic globalization, which brings together
ideological and political projects that try to counter neoliberal ideas and
policies.16 Thinking of the judiciary as a legitimate form of resistance to
other public powers fits into this latter movement.

Judicial activism

regarding social rights is, from a globalization analysis perspective, part of a
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counterhegemonic power that fights for social justice in the context of the
global economy. It does so through the imposition of legal limitations
against the advance of neoliberalism and its consequences: market
deregulation and an emphasis on civil and political rights as the only rights
worth the state’s protection. Defending social rights requires a permanent
state redistributive policy, which clashes with neoliberal logic and has been
expressly fought against by neoliberals.

Consequently, social rights

protection could become a prime example of the resistance against
neoliberalism.
The second interpretation critically analyzes judicial power as a
functional apparatus and means of legitimizing neoliberal strategies.17
From this perspective, the judicial protection of social rights gives the
impression that neoliberalism will not impede the attainment of social
inclusion or the struggle against inequality. However, this perspective fails
to acknowledge that judicial protection of social rights would neither allow
the full guarantee of these rights nor inhibit the advancement of neoliberal
policies. Accordingly, social rights protection would be reduced to the
concession of meaningless legal victories, which would not constitute a real
challenge to neoliberalism.

Moreover, those victories would have the

perverse effect of deviating attention—through their emphasis on the legal
strategy—away from the true political and counterhegemonic struggle that
could resist neoliberalism. Thus, far from being counterhegemonic, this
perspective posits that social rights protection would become an important
part of hegemonic globalization in a neoliberal sense.
C.

The Compromissary Theory: Finding Effective, yet Limited, Resistance
to Neoliberal Policies Through the Judiciary
It is possible to find a compromissary theory18 that falls between the two

interpretations previously described. According to this theory, progressive
judicial protection of social rights constitutes effective resistance to the
advancement of neoliberal policies.

Nonetheless, the effects of this
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resistance are, if individually considered, only partial. To overcome the
limited effectiveness of judicial protection, a strategy for the defense of
social rights that transcends the legal sphere must be created and carried out
by nonjudicial public actors and popular social movements.
The judicial protection of social rights has the capacity of imposing some
substantial limitations on the progress of neoliberal policies, which should
be considered an important accomplishment of the counterhegemonic
globalization project.19 Yet, in the absence of a wider counterhegemonic
strategy, it is difficult for the judicial power, on its own, to prevent the
advance of neoliberalism. Indeed, an effective counterhegemonic strategy
would require the support of the judicial protection of social rights by both
de facto and political powers in the national and international context. In
addition, the strategy would have to address the transfer of rights protection
to other areas of struggle beyond the legal domain (i.e. to the political
arena). The judicial progressive activism regarding social rights undertaken
by the Colombian Constitutional Court (CCC) is a good example of the
plausibility of this interpretation.
D.

Illustrating the Compromissary Theory: The Experience of the
Colombian Constitutional Court
Since its creation in 1991, the CCC has actively and progressively

defended the protection of social rights in areas such as health, labor, social
security, education, and housing. Its endeavors have constituted effective
resistance to the neoliberal policies that have been implemented in
Colombia. These policies have developed the neoliberal economic clauses
present in the Colombian Constitution, which clash with the social promises
of the constitutional text.20

Indeed, through a strategy of economic

liberalization and with the support of international agencies, the Colombian
government

has

privileged

the

neoliberal

orientation

of

certain

constitutional clauses over the rights-based general orientation of the
Constitution.21 In contrast, the CCC has emphasized the importance of
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protecting constitutional rights, human dignity, social inclusion, and
equality and has, therefore, imposed specific, considerable limitations on
neoliberal policies.
Nonetheless, the CCC’s decisions in these areas focus on individual
protection of social rights.

The limits imposed by the CCC on

neoliberalism’s advancement have focused on avoiding the destruction of
the essential content of those social rights.

Accordingly, the CCC’s

decisions have imposed not-so-fragile barriers to neoliberal policies; yet,
the decisions have failed to go beyond this, as they have not attacked these
policies in a profound manner. Consequently, the CCC’s decisions have in
no way prevented the fundamental restructuring of neoliberal state policies
in Colombia or posed a true challenge to these policies on a global scale.
Truthfully, because of various limitations imposed on the judiciary, the
situation could not be any different or better. The problem in Colombia is
that the struggle for social rights protection, which the CCC has embarked
upon, has been mostly a lonely and isolated struggle. Beyond some voices
coming from civil society and academia, which receive the CCC’s work on
these issues with enthusiasm, the legislative and executive powers strongly
defend and vigorously advocate for neoliberal policies.22 In fact, these
powers perceive the CCC’s actions as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
those neoliberal policies,23 which they claim have democratic characteristics
and broad support from certain sectors in society.24

Furthermore, the

legislative and executive powers’ defense of neoliberal policies gains power
because of the wider globalization project, encouraged and partly
subsidized by de facto international powers.25
Faced with an increasingly consolidated coalition of state and
international powers that favor the implementation of neoliberal policies in
Colombia, the CCC’s decisions regarding social rights could hardly put up a
meaningful barrier to prevent neoliberalism’s advance. This assessment is
in no way a criticism against constitutional courts in general or against the
CCC in particular.

It is simply intended as a warning concerning the
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possible overvaluation and excessive hope that neoliberalism’s critics may
place on judicial progressive activism with regards to social rights. Indeed,
the judicial power’s field of action as a social emancipation mechanism is,
per se, limited. However, even though judicial protection of social rights on
its own is not enough to prevent the progress of neoliberal strategies, it is an
important obstacle in preventing neoliberal strategies from resulting in the
complete annulment of people’s rights.
Moreover, while social rights protection currently does not constitute an
efficient counterhegemonic strategy, it can constitute a base and motivation
for such a strategy in Colombia. Social rights can become the symbol of a
political and social movement26 that can more openly critique the
indiscriminate advance of neoliberal policies and fight for an alternative
model of economic development and globalization.

Even though the

consolidation of an anti-neoliberal social and political movement seems
quite distant in current Colombian reality given the political and de facto
powers’ alignment in favor of neoliberalism’s progress,27 it cannot be
discarded as unattainable. The first step—a crucial step—in constructing
and implementing a counterhegemonic strategy is to consider the judicial
protection of social rights as an effective, although partial, resistance to the
neoliberal advance.
Thus, the legal protection of social rights as a tool for obtaining justice,
equality, and social inclusion is important but, on its own, insufficient.
Only if it is conceived of as part of a wider political, social, and economic
strategy struggling against the neoliberal model can it have long-lasting,
structural counterhegemonic effects. Indeed, this wider counterhegemonic
strategy should serve as a general framework and source of legal strategy.
Moreover, the wider counterhegemonic strategy would work to reinforce
the legal strategy by accomplishing overall strategic goals outside the legal
sphere.
The case of the CCC’s intervention concerning social rights in general,
and health and labor rights in particular, proves the partial effectiveness of
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the judiciary in resisting neoliberal policies. In the next section, I discuss
the context in which the CCC was created and has acted throughout the last
fifteen years, so as to identify the political and institutional elements that
might have influenced its progressive activism regarding social rights
protection.

Then I discuss two specific examples—health and labor

rights—which illustrate the way the CCC has resisted neoliberal policies by
vigorously protecting social rights. For both health and labor rights, there
are existent tensions between neoliberal policies, which in recent decades
have been implemented in Colombia in the areas of public health and labor
law, and the progressive decisions taken by the CCC concerning these
matters.

My analysis of those tensions shows that even though these

judicial decisions have imparted effective limits to neoliberal policies
concerning these issues, they have not attacked the core of these policies.
This is due in part to the CCC limiting its decisions to those issues that do
not pose any structural challenges to neoliberalism and to the lack of
support the CCC has received from political and de facto powers. Lastly, in
conclusion, I discuss the limitations of and potential for the CCC’s rulings
on these matters as a counterhegemonic power vis-à-vis neoliberalism.

II. A FAVORABLE SOCIOLEGAL SETTING FOR THE JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS28
The advent of judicial protection of social rights in Colombia occurred
through changes in the national Constitution and the creation of an
accessible system of justice that encourages judicial activism. The judicial
protection of social rights only became possible in Colombia with the
promulgation of the 1991 Constitution, which incorporated new social,
economic, and cultural rights as part of a rich Charter of Rights.29 It also
created the Constitutional Court as an institution specifically devoted to the
interpretation of the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights.30
In contrast to the Supreme Court of Justice, the former institution in charge
of carrying on the judicial review, the CCC engaged in progressive
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activism, not only regarding social rights, but also regarding many other
areas of constitutional law.31 This progressive activism was the product of
several contextual elements, but it was most notably the result of the
constitutional text’s breadth regarding rights32 and the creation of protective
judicial mechanisms.33

It was also a consequence of the increasing

weakness of social movements and political representation in Colombia.34
A.

Constitutional Content’s Role in Progressive Activism
The CCC’s progressive activism can be explained, first, by the content of

the Constitution itself and the context in which it was enacted. Indeed, in
stark contrast with the preceding Constitution, the 1991 Constitution
incorporated a rich set of individual, social, and collective rights35
accompanied with effective mechanisms for their direct enforcement by the
judiciary.36

This can be explained by the context in which the 1991

Constitution was enacted and, thus, by the ideological orientations it
contains. Instead of being the product of a triumphant revolution, the 1991
Constitution was the result of a consensual effort to confront a hostile
environment of political corruption and violence through broadening
democracy.37 This occurred because many traditionally excluded social and
political sectors were able to participate in the Constituent Assembly, such
as members of demobilized guerrilla groups, religious and political
minorities, indigenous communities, and student movements.38
The diverse composition of the Constituent Assembly illustrated a desire
to change the country’s societal model and, in particular, to create a more
inclusive society and bring about social justice by imposing welfare duties
upon the state. These attempts were realized partly through the creation of a
broad Charter of Rights, which includes not only civil and political rights,
but also social, economic, cultural, and collective rights.39 In addition, the
goal of attaining a more just society materialized through constitutional
dispositions, which addressed the direct applicability of broadly recognized
constitutional rights.40 Indeed, with a serious intention of making these

CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF FREE TRADE THEORY

Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers? 541

rights effective norms rather than mere political compromises—as they
were interpreted prior to 1991—the Constitution states that many of these
rights are directly enforceable41 and cannot be suspended during states of
siege.42

It also establishes that human rights treaties ratified by the

Colombian state are legally binding in the same way that constitutional
rights are.43 Moreover, regarding social rights, the Constitution specifically
recognizes them as subjective and enforceable rights and, thus, establishes a
correlative duty on the state to satisfy them.44
The effectiveness of constitutional rights was not simply guaranteed by
declarations of their direct enforceability, but also by a constitutional
procedural design that makes access to constitutional justice a simple,
affordable, and accessible endeavor.45 In fact, the 1991 Constitution created
the tutela action, which permits any person to request any judge in the
country to protect his or her fundamental rights whenever they are being
violated or threatened by the action or omission of a state institution or of a
particular person exercising a dominant position.46 Given that the tutela
action exempts citizens from complying with any particular prerequisites in
order to make the legal claim47 (in fact, the tutela action does not even need
to be written48), it is rather easy for any person to transform a complaint into
a constitutional issue. Moreover, judges have to decide tutela actions prior
to any other legal claims and, therefore, these actions are decided within a
short period of time.49 Thus, tutela actions provide ordinary citizens with
an accessible and inexpensive mechanism to challenge the infringement of
fundamental rights. 50
Along with the tutela action, the preservation of fundamental rights is
also assured by the CCC’s power to annul the tutela rulings of any judge.51
This power consists of the CCC’s revising, by a sort of certiorari, all those
tutela rulings that are, according to its discretion, worthy of a
pronouncement.52 Furthermore, the CCC’s power to annul or modify the
rulings of all other Colombian judges also permits citizens to present tutela
actions involving judicial decisions—even those coming from other higher
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courts, such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the State Council—that
severely and flagrantly violate a fundamental right.53 The rulings of these
tutela actions may end up being revised by the CCC, which then has the
power to close the constitutional debate and, consequently, to preside over
all judges in the country concerning constitutional matters.54
Moreover, the CCC’s powers are not limited to tutela actions.

The

constitutional tribunal also exercises judicial review through its exclusive
power of deciding “public actions of unconstitutionality”, which any citizen
may bring against all laws and certain governmental decrees.55

Public

actions of unconstitutionality have existed in Colombia since 1910 and
formerly fell under the power of the Supreme Court of Justice.56 Thus,
since its creation, the CCC has been able to exercise abstract control of the
constitutionality of norms in a progressive way. Indeed, given that judicial
review has long been part of the Colombian legal tradition, neither the
citizenry nor other state institutions viewed its exercise by the CCC as
strange or exaggerated.57 As with tutela actions, the CCC’s progressive
activism, through its constitutionality rulings, has also been possible
because of the absence of special prerequisites for citizens bringing public
actions of unconstitutionality58 and, thus, has resulted in the frequent use of
this action by citizens. Citizens can, in fact, directly petition the CCC to
declare the unconstitutionality of a law without having an interest in the
issue and without the need of a lawyer.59
B.

Courts as a Default: How Political and Social Context Created
Judicial Progressive Activism
Besides the aforementioned institutional elements, there are also

extrajudicial structural factors that have stimulated the CCC’s progressive
activism regarding social rights.60 To begin with, these factors concern the
country’s

social

weaknesses.

61

movements

and

opposition

parties’

traditional

An additional factor has been the country’s deep crisis of

political representation.62 This crisis stems from citizens feeling a general
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lack of representation in the political arena, which has resulted in wide
sectors of society seeking solutions from the Constitutional Court for
political problems that should be, in principle, resolved by Congress and
government.63 Without a doubt, the CCC’s activism has given it important
doses of legitimacy in the eyes of the Colombian citizenry.64
Yet, the CCC’s legitimacy cannot be explained exclusively in terms of its
willingness to solve the problems for which citizens have not found
solutions in political institutions. In general, the CCC has taken decisions
concerning these problems in a progressive—more than a conservative—
way.65 This has been especially pronounced regarding the protection of
social rights.66

The CCC’s progressive activism on this matter can be

explained by the fact that many of the political forces that were the main
participants in the Constituent Assembly dispersed and weakened soon
thereafter.67 Thus, political institutions, and Congress in particular, were
not composed of people truly committed to the development and
implementation of the 1991 Constitution’s goal of a social state of law and
an inclusive society, and such responsibility fell to the Constitutional Court.
The lack of commitment to the Constitution’s social promises by political
actors was particularly acute because of internal tensions in the Constitution
between social promises and neoliberal economic clauses.68 In general,
since the writing of the 1991 Constitution and with the support of
international financial agencies, the Colombian government has tended to
privilege the neoliberal component of the Constitution by implementing a
strategy of economic liberalization.69

The favored neoliberal strategy

includes policies to privatize public services, minimize state intervention in
the redistribution of wealth, and individualize social rights protection.70
In such a setting, the CCC has ended up being one of the few state
institutions eager to defend the social clauses and progressive content of the
Constitution.

This semi-isolated struggle against the devastating

advancement of neoliberal policies in Colombia has provided the CCC with
important support from certain societal sectors who sympathize with the
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Constitution’s social promises and benefit from their implementation.71
However, it has also been confronted by other social sectors—often more
powerful—and by many state institutions who emphatically criticize the
CCC’s progressiveness as an obstacle to economic development.72
Consequently, these sectors have proposed several legal reforms in order to
curtail the CCC’s powers dramatically, particularly regarding the CCC’s
vigorous protection of social rights.73

III. THE CCC’S PROGRESSIVE PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS VISÀ-VIS THE ADVANCEMENT OF NEOLIBERAL POLICIES
The CCC’s work on the subject of social rights has been prolific and
varied. Indeed, the Court has produced a great number of rulings on the
matter, each addressing very different issues.74 Many of these rulings have
placed important obstacles in front of, but not created structural challenges
to, the state’s neoliberal policies concerning various social rights.75 Instead
of exhaustively describing all of these rulings, the cases of health and labor
rights will be used to illustrate this situation.76 These issues are examples of
the way in which the CCC has exercised an important, although limited,
role of resistance vis-à-vis the implementation of neoliberal policies in
Colombia.
A.

The Case of the Right to Health
The CCC’s activism in protecting the right to health of Colombian

citizens came during a time of increased privatization of health services due
to the implementation of neoliberal policies, and was made possible through
citizens’ utilization of the tutela actions to preserve their constitutional
rights to health, human dignity, and personal integrity.
The Colombian health system suffered a profound restructuring in the
early 1990s, with the passing of Law 100 in 1993.77

With a marked

neoliberal policy of opening public health services to market forces, the
system proposed under Law 100 had attaining total basic health system
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coverage as its main objective (i.e., to cover the entire Colombian
population).78 While the objective of Law 100 is not itself problematic, the
methods for attaining total basic health care have led to a lack of protection
for certain aspects of the right to health care.
For example, in order to accomplish total basic health care, Law 100
made it possible for private sector, mixed public-private, and alreadyexistent public entities to compete for the provision of the service.79 Health
care providers could do so either as Health Promoter Entities (Entidades
Promotoras de Salud, EPS) or as Health Service Providers (Instituciones
Prestadoras del Servicio de Salud, IPS).80 The argument behind the law
was that the provision of health services should be based on a contribution
system for employed people or for those with the ability to contribute as
independent workers.81 Furthermore, Law 100 created a subsidized health
system (SISBEN) for people unable to contribute to their own health care;
SISBEN was financed with national and state fiscal resources and by
contributions from those who could afford it.82
The presumption behind the reform was that by putting an important part
of health services in the hands of the private sector, the public health service
could be more efficient and provide coverage for many of the people the
previous system was unable to cover.83 In order for the subsidized health
system to be financed efficiently and for the “business” of providing public
health service to be profitable, Law 100 and its regulatory decrees
established a series of restrictions and conditions on accessing basic health
system services.84 These included, for example, the restriction of services
and medicine provided in the Mandatory Health Plan (Plan Obligatorio de
Salud, POS) as a means to exclude high-cost or preexistent illnesses, among
other things.85
These restrictions and conditions on access to medicine and treatments
free of additional cost (other than an individual’s contribution) have been
the main target of the CCC’s rulings concerning the right to health. Indeed,
through the conexity doctrine,86 the CCC has insisted that all constitutional
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judges should indirectly protect the right to health in specific cases.87 The
CCC distinguishes fundamental rights—such as the rights to life, dignity, or
personal integrity—from other nonfundamental rights found in the
Constitution: social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as collective
rights.88 As a general rule, the Constitution establishes that only
fundamental rights have immediate application and, hence, can be judicially
protected in a direct manner and preferably through the tutela action.89
However, finding conexity with a fundamental right, the CCC has accepted
the possibility of judicially protecting nonfundamental social rights in those
cases where their vulnerability would imply the violation of one or more
fundamental rights.90
Concerning the right to health, conexity is generally established with the
fundamental rights to life, physical integrity, and human dignity.91 In these
cases, the application of the conexity doctrine aims to protect an
individual’s right to health through a tutela ruling.92 For example, this
happens whenever a citizen requests a judge to order a medical entity to
provide free treatment or medicines, which are initially excluded from the
Mandatory Health Plan.93 When the tutela action is adjudicated against a
private entity, that private entity can appeal to the state’s Solidarity and
Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA) to recover
the surplus cost not covered by the Mandatory Health Plan.94 When a tutela
action is adjudicated against a public entity, the public entity assumes the
cost of the treatment or medicine.95 The logic underlying the distinction
between private and public entities is that private entities should not bear
the cost of a state decision that affects the affordability and competitiveness
of the health business.
Since its first rulings in the early 1990s, the CCC’s decisions have been
truly progressive, as they have implicated the protection of the right to
health when the right to physical integrity or life (considered not only as the
right to survive, but as the right to do so under humane conditions) is in
danger. Nonetheless, until 1998, the progressive character of the
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constitutional rulings on this issue did not produce any major resistance or
criticisms from public authorities or members of civil society, probably
because the economic effects of the rulings on the public budget were not
very important.96 Resistance and criticism began with vehemence in 1998
when the number of tutela rulings on health issues increased exponentially,
resulting in an increase in public expenditures on health issues.97
Tutela actions concerning the right to health went from 10 percent of
total tutela actions presented in the country in 1995 to 30 percent in 1999.98
This meant that, whereas in 1995 citizens brought three thousand tutela
actions concerning the protection of the right to health, in 1999, the number
increased to approximately forty thousand tutela actions.99 Accordingly, the
number of tutela actions presented against the state entity provider of public
health service alone (the Social Security Institute, or Instituto de Seguro
Social, ISS) increased from 2,999 to 10,771 in 1998. This implied an
outstanding growth of public expenditure on health issues from two million
dollars in 1998 to almost seven million dollars in 1999.100
A plausible reason for this outstanding increase of right to health tutela
actions may be found in the fact that constitutional judges were consistently
making favorable rulings for citizens. Thus, citizens began to see tutela
actions as a mechanism to obtain medical services that were excluded from
the Mandatory Health Plan in an easy and prompt way. Practice also shows
that private health providers started suggesting that citizens bring tutela
actions in order to receive the excluded medical services because the
FOSYGA would end up covering the additional cost.
This steep increase in the use of tutela actions in order to obtain health
services that were not part of the Mandatory Health Plan has caused a great
polemic for three reasons. First, the health system appears to lack longterm sustainability because of the Colombian state’s scarce resources.101
Second, the system may cause inequality problems because only those
system users who invoke the tutela action can have state-financed access to
the services excluded from the Mandatory Health Plan.102 Finally, some
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argue that the resources designated to the health service are used in an
inefficient manner by covering high-cost illnesses and medicines, which
prevents wider and more complete coverage of services for the rest of the
population.103
However, the other side of the story is portrayed by those who benefit
concretely from the system and have seen a broadening of their health
protection, as well as by other users who are more aware of the possibility
that their right to health will be protected, even in those cases where the law
does not provide for it.104 The active promotion of individual protection of
the right to health by the CCC has had a fundamental impact on the
satisfaction of many citizens’ basic need for health protection;
consequently, it has improved their quality of life.105 Furthermore, it has
spread the message to many citizens that their physical integrity or dignity
will be protected when faced with life-threatening situations.
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the CCC’s rulings in health
matters have restricted the protection of this right to individual cases only.
In so doing, the Court has limited the possible harmful effects of the health
policy upon individual citizens’ rights, but it has never attacked the policy’s
overall structure or design.

In addition, having found Law 100 to be

constitutional (except for certain particular dispositions), the CCC assumes
that the state’s health policy, considered as a whole, is compatible with the
Colombian constitutional system.106 Moreover, the CCC only corrects the
policy’s excesses or its harmful effects in particular cases, consistently
making it clear that the protection of the right to health is only given in
exceptional cases: when a fundamental right is in danger, the user does not
have enough resources to pay for the excluded service, and a doctor from
the entity in question orders the service.107
Despite its sometimes limited application, the CCC’s stance on the right
to health care has not only placed human dignity at the core of the
discussion, but it has also improved the quality of life of countless citizens
who would otherwise have had to sacrifice their lives and health due to
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utilitarian considerations. Furthermore, the Court’s position respects the
importance of the results coming from the democratic debate and, thus,
justifies judicial intervention only when it identifies abuses regarding
citizens’ fundamental rights. Accordingly, the CCC has imposed effective
barriers against the harmful effects of the neoliberal policy, which partially
privatized public health services and opened it to market forces. It has done
so by establishing clear limits to the potential violation of rights, even when
violating citizens’ rights is beneficial to the efficiency of the system and its
coverage ratio.108
Additionally, with this progressive protection of the right to health, the
CCC has spread the message that social rights are not mere promises but
that the justice system can effectively uphold them. This message has
resonated in the political debate by generating initiatives promoted in
Congress to reform Law 100.109 These reforms seek to incorporate in the
law constitutional precedent regarding the right to health and move this
right from a programmatic status to that of a directly applicable right.110
Despite the increased discussion on the need to reform Law 100, there are
still many open questions on how the changes would be made and what
impact they would have on neoliberal policies in general. For example, it is
still not clear whether these initiatives would mean a structural reform of
Law 100 or whether they would be limited to the protection of the right to
health as a fundamental right only in the exceptional cases pointed out by
the CCC’s doctrine. Further, these initiatives have been formulated based
on scattered efforts from actors that represent minority visions in the
population (particularly former judges from the Constitutional Court111) and
are not based on a cohesive movement made by health system users.112
Alternatively, these initiatives may be resisted by government institutions,
which might lead them to fail. Finally, these Congressional attempts
compete with other projects to reform Law 100 which follow a different
ideology113 that tends to reinforce the health policy’s neoliberal orientation
of providing efficient service and avoiding complete system collapse.114
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According to the promoters of these neoliberal legal initiatives, the system
is deemed to fail as a result of the CCC’s decisions and the health subsidy
offered to citizens without financial resources.115 Some of these proposals
are currently in the final phase of becoming law—they have been passed by
Congress and are awaiting for presidential sanction, which will doubtlessly
come about, given that the proposals have received wide support from the
government.116
In spite of the consequences that the imminent passage of this law will
have, the CCC’s activism in regards to health care and protecting the basic,
and fundamental, rights to life and personal dignity of Colombia’s citizenry
serves a valuable and positive role in counteracting neoliberal health care
policies. While the CCC’s rulings address individual cases under specific
circumstances, their impact has sparked political debate and may serve as a
catalyst to Colombia implementing a more just and equitable system of
health care in the future.

Unfortunately, given the current law reform

proposals, it appears this will not happen in the short term.
B.

The Case of Labor Rights
The CCC’s rulings on labor matters have followed a similar logic to that

on health issues in the sense that, when facing a system where labor
conditions are more flexible and public spending continues to be cut, the
rulings have limited some aspects of the state’s policy.

Although the

purpose of these limits has been to guarantee individual rights, they have
not prevented the neoliberal strategy from continuing its path.
Since the early 1990s, the Colombian government has backed before
Congress a series of neoliberal type reforms of the Labor Code (Código
Sustantivo de Trabajo).117 Only until 2002 was it successful in passing a
reform of that type, through Law 789.118 The objective of this law was to
make the workers’ protection system more flexible when it comes to issues
such as wages, social benefits, extra hours, dismissals, and tryout periods.119
The assumption behind these labor reforms is that if employers have fewer
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labor costs, they will be able to generate more employment and the national
economy, which has long been in crisis, will be reactivated.120
Despite the fact that several years passed since such reforms were
implemented, this assumption has yet to be empirically proven, given that
the unemployment rate has not significantly improved and workers’
conditions seem to have worsened.121 However, the CCC has implicitly
accepted this assumption through rulings, which have primarily found the
labor flexibility policy justified.122

Indeed, when simply analyzing its

constitutionality, the CCC has not struck down the legislative reform even
though it has deemed it regressive when compared with previous labor
protections.123 Thus, although the CCC has stated that regressive measures
concerning the protection of social rights are unconstitutional and violate
international treaties that stipulate the principle of progressiveness of such
rights,124 according to the CCC, regressive measures can be justified if and
only if (1) they fall within the criteria of reasonability and proportionality;
and (2) they have the potential to help overcome a profound economic
crisis.125
Ruling C-038 of 2004 exemplifies the CCC’s stand regarding regressive
measures.126 This ruling declared the constitutionality of Law 789 of 2002,
even though it considerably reduced the content of several labor guarantees
that workers had previously considered important gains.127 In its decision,
the CCC defended the thesis of the immovable character of acquired
rights.128 However, it nuanced this thesis by applying the proportionality
principle. In particular, the CCC argued that withdrawing the protections
afforded by social rights legislation should be seen as unconstitutional and,
yet, it could be justified for grave reasons, such as profound economic
difficulties that make it impossible to maintain the previous degree of rights
protection.129 Therefore, according to the CCC, regressive measures to
augment labor flexibility, aimed at increasing employment and economic
growth, would be justifiable.130
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Thus, the CCC’s ruling in no way imposes a structural obstacle to the
neoliberal policy of labor flexibility that favors the strengthening of the
market. Moreover, in a certain manner, the CCC agrees with the policy
when it justifies it as a way to overcome the unemployment crisis in the
country. This does not mean, however, that the CCC has completely agreed
with all the necessary measures for the implementation of such a policy;
indeed, many of the Court’s rulings have created effective obstacles to the
policy in an attempt to prevent individual rights from being trampled. In
fact, the CCC’s imposition of the proportionality burden on the state and the
exceptional circumstances in which it admits regressive measures are
important limitations to the neoliberal policy of labor flexibility. According
to the CCC, as a general rule, the state must accept the progressiveness
principle in social rights and prevent these rights from being harmed in such
a way that their situation is worse than before the measure.131 In case of not
doing so, the state must give compelling reasons for worsening workers’
rights.132
On several occasions these criteria have led the CCC to declare state
policies that violate workers’ rights unconstitutional. Two examples are the
reformation of workers’ pension system and the freezing of civil servants’
salaries.133 These neoliberal measures no longer seek to make labor law
more flexible but rather operate to constrain public spending.134 The CCC
determined that such a reason for restraining workers’ rights was not
compelling enough to warrant adopting regressive labor policies.
Concerning the implementation of a less favorable pension system for
certain workers135 who were close to retirement age, the CCC expressed that
the workers had not acquired rights regarding their future pensions; yet, it
was legitimate for these workers to expect to receive their pension under the
conditions established under the previous law.136 Therefore, the CCC ruled
against the state’s policy of reducing the fiscal deficit through the
elimination of the pension plan, which represents an extremely heavy
burden for the state.137 Moreover, the CCC established that Congress’s
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freedom to rule on the matter could not be exercised in an unreasonable and
disproportionate manner, as it would violate the social right to social
security.138
Regarding the civil servants’ wage system, the CCC established the
doctrine of the right to a vital and mobile wage.139 Indeed, the court was
facing a state policy that wanted to “freeze” (i.e. not index to inflation) civil
servants’ wages that were above two minimum salaries—the state’s aim
was to alleviate the country’s long-standing and profound economic
crisis.140

Consequently, the CCC emitted a ruling declaring the

unconstitutionality of such a measure and ordering the readjustment of all
those salaries that had not been indexed.141
However, the CCC has not been constant in its radically protective
position when it comes to the right of civil servants’ wage mobility. In
more recent rulings, it has decided to change its position by arguing that
workers’ purchasing power is untouchable for those workers who earn less
than two minimum salaries.

Yet, regarding the rest of the workers, a

restrictive measure can be reasonable and proportional when facing an
economic crisis,142 if and only if this measure is temporary and is intended
to help overcome the crisis.143 Moreover, annual salary raises can, at most,
be limited to 50 percent—no more.144
In the aforementioned cases, the CCC has imposed important restrictions
on labor flexibility policies and cutting public spending for civil servants’
pensions and wages. Furthermore, through these actions, the CCC has
limited the harmful effects of neoliberal strategies on workers’ rights to
work, have a salary, and have social security. Nonetheless, for better or for
worse, these are once again restrictions that do not address the core of
neoliberal structural reform policies with respect to labor legislation; on the
contrary, in a certain way, these policies are accepted and justified during an
economic crisis, thereby implicitly facilitating neoliberal policies.
However, through its decisions, the CCC has had a positive impact not
only upon working conditions and workers’ quality of life, but also by
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opening the way for a political struggle in favor of workers’ rights. The
Court has accomplished this by recognizing that these rights cannot be
trampled upon by state policies on the matter.145
In addition, throughout the years, the CCC has reinforced workers’ rights
by upholding the right to form labor unions and by protecting workers from
direct or indirect discrimination.146 Even though the right to form a labor
union is a fundamental right according to the 1991 Constitution, it is also a
social right in a wider sense because it constitutes a necessary condition for
workers to claim the protection of their social rights.147 As a consequence
of the CCC’s active protection, some labor union leaders have admitted
seeing “the light at the end of the tunnel” of loneliness, violence, and
inefficiency of political actions; a tunnel in which they have been immersed
for a long period.148 Through legal strategy, workers have found a new way
to fight for their rights and renew their movement. Because of this, even
though they are aware that it is only one tool in the struggle, they have
begun to see the judicial system as a mechanism to satisfy their demands, at
least in the short run.
In that way, as with health care, the CCC should be seen as an important
obstacle to unchecked neoliberal labor policies, as it operates to help protect
social rights of Colombian workers.

IV. CONCLUSION: LIMITS AND POTENTIALITIES OF THE
JUSTICIABILITY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS AS A COUNTERHEGEMONIC
MECHANISM
Without a doubt, the progressive protection of health and labor rights
promoted by the CCC has constituted an important obstacle to the
devastating advance of neoliberal policies implemented in these fields. The
CCC has explicitly recognized that these policies cannot come to the point
of invaliding such important rights as health, physical integrity, life, labor,
wage mobility, social security and the expectation of receiving a pension.
Furthermore, the CCC has protected the value of life under humane
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conditions, upholding workers’ purchasing power and workers’ legitimate
expectations to retire under the conditions they had foreseen.
Accordingly, the CCC has had a positive effect upon the quality of life of
many human beings. Additionally, it has spread the message that when in a
vulnerable situation, people’s voices can be heard and the state cannot
trample individual rights as it pleases. With this message, the CCC has
made it possible for the discourse regarding the defense of such rights to
have a place in the political arena. Moreover, it has also inspired legislative
initiatives that incorporate the rules established by the CCC—for example,
the right to health—and has also served to ignite the spark for weakened
social movements—as in the case of workers.149 In order to achieve these
protections, the CCC has used different, sometimes contradictory,
strategies.

For instance, on the one hand, it has defended legitimate

expectations and in some cases acquired rights (based upon the principle of
legality), and on the other hand, it has recognized that the protection of
constitutional rights can be given, in some cases, even when it is against
legal dispositions (for example, when ordering the provision of health
services excluded from the Mandatory Health Plan).
Therefore, the CCC has shown that its rulings concerning social rights
can have direct and indirect emancipatory effects.150 It has also presented
itself as a political actor, defending and protecting social rights causes
through different argumentative strategies.151 Accordingly, the CCC seems
like a counterhegemonic power of great importance and ability to effectuate
concrete changes. Moreover, the Court has an expansive defense strategy
concerning social rights, which imposes limitations on neoliberal policies
and has the potential of being extended into the political arena. Therefore,
the CCC plays a crucial role in the creation of a counterhegemonic
globalization project by defending the social rights protection argument that
so often clashes with neoliberal policies. In so doing, the CCC is part of a
wider context of progressive justiciability of social rights in different
countries around the world.
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However, the CCC’s role as part of this counterhegemonic project has
well-defined and well-established limits, which means that its actions
cannot be considered a sufficient tool in order to confront the neoliberal
strategy. On the one hand, as a judicial institution, the CCC finds its
powers of progressive activism substantially limited by the power of the
majority. The CCC cannot reach the point of replacing the democratic
debate’s function in the decision-making process of economic policies, nor
can it decide how far rights can go. The power of the political majority in
Colombia has had, until the present time, a tendency to favor the
implementation of neoliberal policies to the detriment of a wider social
rights protection.152 There is no doubt the explanation for this is due in part
to the pressure coming from international de facto powers, such as
multilateral financial institutions.153

The latter have pressured political

institutions to implement neoliberal reforms, such as the partial
privatization of the health system, higher flexibility in labor law, and cuts in
public spending in certain areas.154 These pressures diminish government
institutions’ decision-making ability155 and become great obstacles for the
success of the social rights protection strategy.
On the other hand, despite the fact that the Court’s rulings can constitute
the spark that will ignite social and political mobilization in favor of social
rights protection, this spark cannot stay lit on its own; it requires the
existence of wider social movements that defend the political project of
social rights protection at a local level. Furthermore, it is necessary to
connect it with other strategies that move in the same direction at an
international level in order to combat corresponding international neoliberal
pressures. This implies an immense challenge for Colombia, which has
been characterized for decades by weak social mobilization and fragile
political movements.156
The above-mentioned limits sufficiently explain the restrictions imposed
on the CCC’s progressive activism concerning social rights.

A

constitutional court exercises the role of a countermajority power; however,

CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF FREE TRADE THEORY

Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers? 557

it is a countermajority power that cannot go beyond the power of the
majority.157 Thus, even if constitutional tribunals have the crucial task of
limiting the political majority’s excesses, when the latter insists in following
a univocal political orientation, constitutional tribunals cannot undermine
the majority’s democratic foundation.

In Colombia, such a political

orientation has become particularly definite because it is backed and
pressured by de facto international powers that limit the array of options
available in the decision-making process.
Consequently, the only way in which the neoliberal policies can be
countered is by coping with the immense challenge of constructing social
movements capable of defending social rights, as well as establishing
connections with other movements that do so on the international level.
The establishment of these connections concerns not only social movements
and nongovernmental organizations interested in social rights protection,158
but also judges themselves, who should find creative ways of establishing
international networks among them.159 This is by no means an easy task,
but it appears as the only available strategy to use for the protection of
social rights as a consolidated way of resisting neoliberal policies.

1

Researcher of the Center for the Study of Law, Justice and Society (DeJuSticia) and
law lecturer at Universidad de los Andes and the National University of Colombia. I am
very grateful to Claudia Martínez, who generously helped me with the translation of this
paper.
2
I use the expression “neoliberal policies” in a rather strict sense to refer to the package
of structural adjustment measures promoted by multilateral financial institutions in the
1990s during the first and second stages of the so-called Washington Consensus. These
measures consisted of a set of conditions that countries, such as many in Latin America
(including Colombia), had to fulfill in order to be granted loans. Indeed, these countries
were trying to get out of the deep economic crisis of the 1980s, which was a consequence
of the balance of payments deficit. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by
Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7-20
(John Williamson ed., 1990); César A. Rodríguez & Rodrigo Uprimny, ¿Justicia para
Todos o Seguridad para el Mercado? El Neoliberalismo y la Reforma Judicial en
Colombia, in ¿JUSTICIA PARA TODOS? SISTEMA JUDICIAL, DERECHOS SOCIALES Y
DEMOCRACIA EN COLOMBIA 109, 113-16 (2006) [hereinafter Justicia para Todos].
These measures constitute neoliberalism’s paradigmatic policies, in the sense that they try
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to materialize the idea (dominant in the nineteenth century and then again in the late
1970s) that the market is the most appropriate mechanism to coordinate society.
However, these are not the only policies that could be considered as neoliberal. I refer to
them given that they include measures, which, in health and labor law matters, have been
implemented in Colombia. These matters constitute this article’s main argument.
3
Strictly speaking, the expression “social rights” refers to welfare rights, which imply a
positive obligation of the state to deliver a service or an economic subsidy to citizens,
such as the right to education, housing, and health. However, it may also include other
rights, the protection of which is determinant to claim or enjoy welfare rights, such as
labor rights.
4
According to Rodríguez and Uprimny, neoliberal criticisms of social rights come from
three types of relatively independent lines of thought: (1) those proposed by
individualistic liberal philosophy authors, such as Nozick and Hayek; (2) those put
forward from an economic perspective by strictly neoliberal thinkers, such as Milton
Friedman; and (3) those coming from economic neoinstitutionalism founded by Douglass
North. Justicia para Todos, supra note 2, at 118. From a philosophical point of view,
Hayek’s and Nozick’s criticisms are directed to the concept of social rights itself, which,
according to them, is incompatible with civil rights and leads to the destruction of the
liberal order and to authoritarianism. Moreover, proponents of this perspective argue that
true freedom is negative freedom or that of noninterference and that property rights are an
essential factor for the protection of freedom. The market is thus the most appropriate
way for social regulation, which is why the state’s function should be limited to
guarantee that neither it nor anyone else could interfere in the exercise of personal
freedom and in the right to property. Given the importance of property in these lines of
thought as a means to enjoy freedom, redistributive policies are considered as
authoritarian and unjust, as they have nonconsensual effects upon property. Social rights
are, consequently, mere “mirages,” which represent “the path towards servitude.”
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1989). Authors, such as
Friedman, argue from an economic and neoliberal point of view that the state can only
intervene in order to guarantee the stability and the growth of the monetary base;
therefore, state intervention and income redistribution policies lead to chronic deficits in
the balance of payments. This leads to an unacceptable increase in the state’s debt, as
well as to a high inflation rate. The latter not only hampers economic growth, but it also
affects the lowest income earners. It is for these reasons that the public policies promoted
by the Washington Consensus are destined to reduce state intervention to a minimum in
order to avoid interference with the free market, as well as to bring down the social
policies promoted in earlier decades. Social rights defense is, then, one of these policies’
main targets. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980). See
also Williamson, supra note 2; Justicia para Todos, supra note 2, at 122-124. Finally,
contrary to neoliberal arguments, from a neoinstitutionalist perspective, the market does
not successfully function on its own; rather, it requires institutions that will guarantee
this. Nonetheless, not all institutions allow the market to function properly, nor do all
institutions encourage economic growth. Only those institutions that do not impose
transaction costs on economic exchanges and that, furthermore, assure the reduction of
such transaction costs, are considered beneficial for the efficient functioning of the
market, and as such, for economic growth. In this manner, those institutions that clearly
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define property rights and guarantee that contracts will be upheld are preferred. An
example of this kind of institution is an efficient and predictable judicial system. Social
rights do not comply with any of these characteristics, as they encourage redistributive
conflicts among economic actors. These actors may prefer to dedicate their efforts to the
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Sociedades Contemporáneas, in EL CALEIDOSCOPIO DE LAS JUSTICIAS EN COLOMBIA 85
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Mauricio García Villegas eds., 2001).
8
See The Enforcement of Social Rights, supra note 7.
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